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In devising rules governing the conduct of takeover transactions, 
policy makers would serve the interests of investors and the economic 
order of society generally better by adopting regulations that 
maximise shareholder and social welfare.  A mandatory bid rule can 
assist to achieve this objective.  By significantly enhancing the 
chances of a takeover succeeding, that rule potentially encourages 
bidders to attempt more hostile acquisitions.  An increase in search 
for potential takeover targets is likely to create some insecurity 
among directors and induce them to perform to their best level.  
Further, as takeovers facilitate the re-allocation of scarce societal 
resources to the parties to whom they have the highest valued uses, 
greater efficiency in the allocation of resources within industries is 
likely to be achieved as the incidence of hostile takeover transactions 
increases.  Also, given that hostile takeovers are invariably made at a 
premium, an increase in that activity is likely to enhance shareholder 
wealth.  These are matters of significant public importance.  For this 
reason, it is advisable to reform the law governing takeover activity to 
introduce a mandatory bid rule in Australia. 
Key terms Hostile takeovers;  market for corporate 
control;  takeover regulation;  mandatory bid 
rule. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In its discussion paper ‘Corporate Control: A Better Environment for Productive 
Investment’,1 the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program2 recommended the reform of 
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the law governing takeover activity to introduce a mandatory bid rule in Australia.  Under 
this proposal, a prospective acquirer would be allowed to cross the current 20% threshold and 
gain control of a company from some selected shareholders in private off-market 
transactions.  This would be on the condition that the acquirer announced immediately an 
unconditional cash offer (or provide a cash alternative) for all the remaining voting shares in 
the company.  Also, the offer would need to be made at the highest price paid over the 
preceding four months by the acquirer for shares in the target company.3  The stated 
objective of this recommendation was to promote a more vibrant market for corporate 
control4 and, ultimately, assist investors in public companies and society generally to more 
fully harness the positive effects of hostile takeover activity. 
In making its recommendation, CLERP was guided by the view that hostile takeover activity 
confers substantial benefits upon shareholders and society generally.5  According to CLERP, 
the advantages of the hostile takeover process include acting as a mechanism for monitoring 
the performance of corporate management and facilitating the replacement of incompetent 
management teams.  To this extent, hostile takeover activity serves to assure the quality of 
corporate management and, in the process, promotes productive efficiency.6  Indeed, the 
observation has been made by some commentators that ‘takeovers are . . . the critical 
corporate governance mechanism  . . . without which managerial discretion cannot be 
 
1 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program, Corporate Control: A Better Environment for Productive 
Investment, Proposals for Reform, Paper No 4, AGPS, Canberra, 1997. 
2 Hereafter, this will be referred to by its acronym, CLERP. 
3 CLERP, above, n 1 at 25.   For a further discussion of the mandatory bid rule proposal see J Mannolini, 
‘CLERP and Takeover Law Reform – Politics Trumping Principle?’ (1999) 10 Aust Jnl of Corp Law 
193;  R Levy & N Patrick, ‘The Mandatory Bid Rule – Where Are We and Can It Be Made to Work?’ 
(2002) 20 C&SLJ 424. 
4 CLERP, above, n 1 at 5. 
5 Ibid, at 7. 
6 Id. 
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effectively controlled.’7  Further, CLERP recognised that hostile takeover activity has the 
potential to enhance the efficient allocation of resources within industries.  It facilitates the 
re-allocation of scarce societal resources to the parties to whom they have the highest valued 
uses.8  An added advantage of hostile takeover transactions is that they invariably provide 
 
7 See R B Thompson ‘Takeover Regulation After the ‘Convergence’ of Corporate Law’ (2002) 24 
Sydney Law Review 320 at 324 (quoting Shleifer & Vishny). 
A substantial volume of academic literature has developed on this subject.  For a representative survey 
see H G Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control' (1965) 73 Journal of Political 
Economy 110; E Berglof & M Burkart, ‘European Takeover Regulation’ 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=405660, (date accessed 4 May 2004) at 193-4;  C Bradley, ‘Corporate Control: 
Markets and Rules' (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 170 at 171-172;  W D Harrington, ‘If It Ain't Broke, 
Don't Fix It: The Legal Propriety of Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids' (1983) 34 Syracuse Law 
Review 977 at 981-983;  A Shleifer & R W Vishny, ‘Value Maximisation and the Acquisition Process' 
(1988) 2 Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 at 11 -13;  V Brudney, ‘A Note on Chilling Tender 
Solicitations' (1967) 21 Rutgers Law Review 609 at 628-630; B Banoff, ‘The Securities Commission's 
Takeover Proposals: A "Law and Economics" Perspective' (1985) 2 Canterbury Law Review 298 at 
298-299;  R Gilson, 'A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case for Defensive Tactics in Tender 
Offers' (1981) 33 Stanford Law Review 819 at 841-845;  Dodd, & R R Officer, Corporate Control, 
Economic Efficiency and Shareholder Justice, The Centre For Independent Studies, Sydney, 1986 at 8-
9;  F H Easterbrook & D R Fischel, ‘Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate 
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers' in R A Posner & K E Scott, Economics of 
Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, Little Brown and Company, Boston and Toronto, 1980 at 
211;  P Holl, ‘Control Type and the Market for Corporate Control in Large U S Corporations' in Posner 
& Scott, loc cit, at 206;  J K Winsen, ‘Regulation of Trading in Corporate Equity: Constraints on 
Takeovers' (1982) 1 C&SLJ 91 at 93;  American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: 
Analysis and Recommendations, American Law Institute Publishers, St Paul, Minn, 1994 at 385; 
P L Davies,  Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law, 6th ed 1997, Sweet & Maxwell, London at 
816;  A Mandelbaum, ‘Economic Aspects of Takeovers Regulation With Particular Reference to New 
Zealand' in J H Farrar, (ed) Takeovers, Institutional Investors and the Modernization of Corporate 
Laws, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993 at 206;  F H Easterbrook & D R Fischel, The 
Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1991 at 
171-174;  P Dodd, ‘Corporate Control: What are the Issues’ in Takeovers and Corporate Control: 
Towards A New Regulatory Environment, Centre For Independent Studies, Sydney and The New 
Zealand Centre For Independent Studies, 1987, at 5. 
Quite significantly, the disciplinary and efficiency enhancing role of hostile takeovers have also been 
recognised by the corporations and securities regulatory authorities of various jurisdictions.  See for 
example National Companies and Securities Commission, Discretions Vested in the Commission, 
Policy Release 105 [This policy statement is still applied by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC).  See ASIC, Practice Note 30 - NCSC Releases];  Canadian Securities 
Administrators, Take-over Bids - Defensive Tactics, Policy Statement No 38, (reproduced in CCH, Can 
Sec L Rep para 470-039) para 1;  Department of Trade and Industry, Mergers Policy: A Department of 
Trade and Industry Paper on the Policy and Procedures of Merger Control, HMSO, London, 1988, 
para 2.27. 
8 CLERP, above, n 1 at 8.  This much has been recognised by several other commentators.  See, by way 
of example, Bradley, above, n 7 at 367;  Brudney, above, n 7 at 628;  F H Easterbrook, & D R Fischel, 
‘Corporate Control Transactions' (1982) 91 Yale Law Journal 698 at 705;  J Pound & R J Zeckhauser 
‘The Economics of Corporate Takeovers and the New Zealand Takeover Code: An Analysis and 
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offeree shareholders with an opportunity to earn a premium, thereby increasing aggregate 
shareholder wealth.9
The CLERP recommendation was accepted by policy makers.10  Subsequently, to give it 
legislative effect, a proposed amendment to the Corporations Law was passed by the House 
of Representatives.11  This initiative was, however, rejected by the Senate.12  The opposition 
 
Proposals For Reform' submission to The New Zealand Securities Commission, (unpublished – copy 
on file with author) May, 1988 at 7;  M C Jensen, ‘Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences' (1988) 
2 Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 at 23;  Bureau of Industry Economics, Department of Industry, 
Technology and Commerce, Mergers and Acquisitions: Issues of Economic Efficiency, Working Paper 
No 53, Canberra, 1989, at 15-16;  Bishop et al, Australian Takeovers: The Evidence 1972-1985, 
Policy Monograph 12, The Centre For Independent Studies, Sydney, 1987, at 11. 
9 See generally P Little, Law of Company Takeovers, Law Book Company, Sydney, 1997 at 5-6; 
Bishop et al, above, n 7, at 26;  Mandelbaum, above, n 7 at 208;  P Dechow, ‘The Share Market's 
Assessment of Initial Acquisitions by Seven Controversial Investors' (1987) 12 Australian Journal of 
Management 23 at 26-27; F H McDougall, & D K Round, The Effects of Takeovers and Mergers in 
Australia, Research Report No 3, Information Australia for the Australian Institute of Management, 
Melbourne, 1986 at 83-86; J Franks, & R Harris, ‘Shareholder Wealth Effects of UK Take-overs: 
Implications for Merger Policy' in J Fairburn, & J Kay, Mergers and Merger Policy, Oxford University 
Press, 1987 at 157-159;  R Roll, ‘Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth' in 
J C Coffee Jr, et al (eds), Knights, Raiders And Targets: The Impact Of The Hostile Takeover, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1988, at 241-242;  J Netter, ‘Ending the Interest Deductibility of Debt 
Used to Finance Takeovers is Still a Bad Idea: The Empirical Evidence on Takeovers, Restrictions on 
Takeovers and Restrictions on Deductibility of Interest' (1990) 15 Journal of Corporate Law 219 at 
227-229;  Jarrell et al,  ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The Evidence Since 1980' (1988) 2 Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 49 at 51-52;  M C Jensen & R S Ruback, ‘The Market for Corporate Control: 
The Scientific Evidence' (1983) 11 Journal of Financial Economics 5 at 9-16;  W Lonergan, The 
Valuation of Businesses, Shares and Other Equity, Longman Professional, Melbourne, 2nd edition, 
1994 at 338;  R Kraakman, ‘Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share 
Prices as an Acquisition Motive' (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 890 at 908 (note especially the data 
in footnote 63). 
10 See Department of the Treasury, CLERP, Commentary on Draft Provisions, AGPS, Canberra, 1998, at 
93 and 97. 
11 See Corporate Law Economic Reform Bill, s 611, item 5.  That provision, which was modelled on 
General Principle 10 and Rule 9 of The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, presently the principal 
regime of takeover regulation in the United Kingdom, relevantly provided: 
Acquisition immediately followed by announcement of mandatory bid 
An acquisition that occurs in, or results from, the following circumstances: 
(a) a person (the acquirer) acquires a relevant interest in securities of a body 
corporate: and 
(b) those securities were held, immediately before the acquisition, by a particular 
person or  by particular persons jointly (the prior holder or holders); and 
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was concerned that the proposed rule, if implemented, would not only disadvantage target 
shareholders13 but also generally emasculate the Eggleston principles upon which the present 
Australian regime of takeover regulation is based.14
This paper argues that in formulating rules governing the conduct of takeover transactions, 
policy makers would serve the interests of investors in public companies and the economic 
order of society generally better by adopting rules that maximise shareholder and social 
wealth.15  Proceeding from this premise, a plea is made for policy makers to reconsider the 
decision not to introduce a mandatory bid rule in Australia.  Unlike some who believe that 
‘the arguments against it clearly outweigh the arguments for it’16 the view taken here is that 
the benefits of a mandatory bid rule are likely to far outweigh its costs.17  Because of the 
substantial benefits that hostile takeover activity can bring to shareholders and the economy 
 
(c) the acquirer does not, at the same time as the acquisition referred to in 
paragraph (a), acquire a relevant interest in securities of the body held by 
someone other than the prior holder or holders; and 
(d) immediately before the acquisition, the voting power of the acquirer in the 
body corporate is below 20%; and  
(e) the acquisition is immediately followed by a public proposal by the acquirer, 
or an associate, to make an unconditional takeover bid for all the securities in 
the class to which the securities belong; and 
(f) before the acquisition occurred, the prior holder or holders were informed that 
the acquisition would lead to that takeover bid. 
The proposal under paragraph (e) must set out the terms on which the acquisition was made. 
12 See the Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, Senate, AGPS, Canberra, 13 
October 1999, at 9253 and 9650. 
13 This issue is considered below in more detail.  See Part 4 of this article. 
14 Ibid, at 9651 (per Sen Conroy).  Arguments to this effect were reiterated in submissions to the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee which re-examined the need for the introduction of a mandatory bid rule in 
Australia.  See The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Joint Statutory 
Committee on Corporations and Securities, Report on the Mandatory Bid Rule, June 2000, 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/manbid/report/contents.htm> (date 
accessed:  29 March 2004) para 2.34.  The Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities 
has now been re-constituted as The Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Financial Services. 
15 On this see further L A Bebchuk, 'The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers' (1981-82) 95 
Harvard Law Review 1028 at 1034. 
16 See the Commonwealth of Australia, Hansard, above, n 12 at 9650 (per Sen Conroy). 
17 The potential benefits of a mandatory bid rule are explored in more detail in Part 3 of this article. 
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generally, the rules governing that activity should, from a shareholder and social welfare 
point of view, produce a large threat of hostile takeover transactions succeeding.18  A 
mandatory bid rule has the potential to achieve this objective.  That rule increases the 
prospects of success of acquisition attempts.  By so doing, it likely encourages prospective 
acquirers to undertake more search to identify potential takeover targets. Increased 
monitoring of corporate performance and the fear of displacement is likely to create some 
insecurity of tenure among directors and spur them to their best performance.19  This can 
only benefit shareholders.  It likely makes current management more efficient.  As well, the 
incidence of more hostile acquisitions is likely to ‘increase social welfare by moving 
productive assets to higher-valued uses and to the hands of better managers.’20
The ensuing discussion is divided into six parts and is organised as follows.  Part 2 outlines 
the legal procedures which, presently, must be observed by any person seeking to acquire 
control of a public company.  That part goes on to argue that the rules now in force are a 
potential disincentive to hostile takeover activity and that by discouraging that activity, 
current law potentially imposes substantial costs on investors and society in general.  Part 3 
demonstrates that many of the difficulties engendered by current takeover law can be 
overcome through the implementation of a mandatory bid rule.  Part 4 examines and attempts 
to rebut some of the arguments commonly advanced against the mandatory bid rule, thus 
laying the foundation for the resurrection of the proposal to introduce that rule in Australia.  
Part 5 explores ways in which the law could be reformed to introduce a workable mandatory 
bid rule.  Some conclusions follow in Part 6. 
 
18 See generally S J Grossman & O D Hart,  ‘Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem and the Theory of 
the Corporation’ (1980) 11 Bell Journal of Economics 42 at 60. 
19 F H Easterbrook & D R Fischel, ‘The Proper Role of Target Management in Responding to a Tender 
Offer' (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 1161 at 1184. 
20 Ibid, at 1182. 
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2 CURRENT LAW 
Presently, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) prohibits any person,21 subject to some 
exceptions,22 from acquiring between 20 and 90 percent of the voting shares of a company 
unless an offer is made to all shareholders of the relevant class of shares to be acquired.23   
The aim of these restrictions is to ensure that a person does not acquire too great an interest in 
a company unless some exemption applies or Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act has 
otherwise been complied with.24 The threshold is set at 20% because it is believed that at this 
level, control of a company is likely to change.25  Effectively then, control of a company can 
pass only after a formal takeover offer has been made.  ‘Pre-bid agreements or 
understandings between bidders and target shareholders are prohibited, where they would 
operate to take the bidder over the statutory threshold.’26
Prior to making its offer, a prospective acquirer is required to prepare a statement containing 
certain prescribed information (the Bidder’s Statement).  That statement, together with a copy 
of the bidder’s pro-forma offer, must then be lodged with ASIC.27  Further, the bidder is 
subject to a pre-offer notification requirement.  It must serve a copy of its Bidder’s Statement 
upon the target company 14-28 days before dispatching its offer to the offeree shareholders.28  
Finally, an offer, once made, must be kept open for acceptance for at least one month.29
 
21 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 606(1). 
22 As to these, see Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 611. 
23 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s633(1) Item 6. 
24 Afro-West Mining Ltd v Australian Mining Investments Ltd (1989) 7 ACLC 618 at 623 (Supreme Court 
of New South Wales – per Cohen J).  See further Little, above, n 9 at 45. 
25 R Levy, Takeovers Law and Strategy, 2nd ed 2002, Lawbook Company, Sydney, at 4. 
26 CLERP, above, n 1 at 19. 
27 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 633 Items 1 and 2. 
28 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 633 Item 3. 
29 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s624(1)(b). 
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These rules are based on the recommendations of the Company Law Advisory Committee 
which was established in 1969 by the Standing Committee of State and Commonwealth 
Attorneys-General of Australia to study and make recommendations on the administration of 
companies and securities laws.30  They seek to improve the protection of the interests of 
shareholders by ensuring, among other things, that control of publicly listed companies does 
not pass by stealth or discriminatory arrangements.31  They also aim to assure every 
shareholder an opportunity to participate in any benefits payable on a change of corporate 
control.32  A further objective of the rules is to ensure that all offeree shareholders have 
adequate time to receive an offer and study its merits.33
 
30 This committee is popularly referred to as the Eggleston Committee, after its chairman Sir Richard 
Eggleston.  The committee recommended the introduction of legislative measures to regulate the 
conduct of takeover transactions.  The Committee further recommended that the object of such 
measures should be neither to encourage nor discourage takeover activity but to ensure that: 
(a) the shareholders and directors of a company know the identity of the person who 
proposes to acquire a substantial interest in the company; 
(b) the shareholders and directors of a company have a reasonable time in which to 
consider any proposal under which a person would acquire a substantial interest in 
the company; 
(c) the shareholders and directors of a company are supplied with sufficient information 
to enable them to assess the merits of any proposal under which any person would 
acquire a substantial interest in the company; 
(d) as far as practicable, all shareholders of a company have equal opportunities to 
participate in any benefits accruing under any proposal under which a person would 
acquire a substantial interest in the company. 
These principles (popularly referred to as the Eggleston criteria) are now enshrined in the legislation as 
matters which must be observed by all participants in the takeover process - see Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth), s602. 
For the Committee’s full recommendations concerning the regulation of takeover activity see 
Disclosure of Substantial Shareholdings and Takeovers (The Second Interim Report), Parliamentary 
Paper No 43/69. 
31 See generally L Masel, foreword to I A Renard & J G Santamaria, Takeovers and Reconstructions in 
Australia, Butterworths, Melbourne, 1990 at v;  K S Gutman, 'Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the 
Business Judgment Rule' (1983) 58 New York University Law Review 621 at 632. 
32 Little, above, n 9 at 9-10.  For a more detailed discussion of the equality principle and its effects see 
J Mayanja, ‘The Equal Opportunity Principle in Australian Takeover Law and Practice:  Time for 
Review?’  (2000) 12 Aust Jnl of Corp Law 1;  M Burkart & F Panunzi, ‘Mandatory Bids, Squeeze-out, 
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Whilst serving these lofty objectives, the current regulatory regime unnecessarily hinders the 
smooth operation of a competitive market for corporate control, as the discussion in the next 
Part will endeavour to show.  This is undesirable.  By erecting unnecessary barriers in the 
way of potential acquirers, current law potentially deters some otherwise beneficial changes 
in corporate control.  This is likely to frustrate the disciplinary, allocative and wealth 
maximising roles of the hostile takeover process.  In consequence, shareholder and social 
welfare are bound to be harmed. 
2.1 The costs of current law 
2.1.1 Current law promotes free riding 
It will be apparent from the foregoing exposition that, presently, the Corporations Act delays 
the conclusion of hostile takeover transactions for significant amounts of time.  Such 
extended delay is detrimental to the interests of acquirers.  Bidders can protect and, 
consequently, appropriate fuller value from their investment in information only if a takeover 
is conducted and concluded with reasonable despatch.  By preventing prospective acquirers 
from concluding hostile takeover transactions as quickly as they can, current law destroys the 
element of speed.  At the same time, it augments the chances of premature leakage of 
commercially sensitive information.  Such an eventuality not only attenuates the searcher’s 
property rights in information, it also renders attempting acquisitions quite risky.  The 
registration of the bidder’s statement, pre-offer notification and the making of a takeover 
offer tip off the market.  The extended delay involved in these processes gives rivals, who 
 
Sell-out and the Dynamics of the Tender Offer Process’ (June 2003), ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 
10/2003. http://ssrn.com/abstract=420940 (date accessed 4 May 2004) at 12-7;  Berglof & Burkart, 
above, n 7 at 174-5 and 196-8;  Mannolini, above, n 3 at 197-212. 
33 Mandelbaum, above, n 7 at 218;  C Patterson, 'Efficiency and Equity in the Regulation of Takeovers' in 
J H Farrar, (ed) Contemporary Issues in Company Law, Commerce Clearing House (New Zealand), 
Auckland, 1987 at 254. 
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may not have incurred search costs, an opportunity to enter the contest34 and possibly outbid 
the initial offeror.35  The emergence of competing bids leads to a greater likelihood of the 
initial bidder being frustrated in its intentions.  This factor is likely to reduce the incentive on 
the part of many prospective acquirers to engage in search and be the first bidder.36  As 
prospective acquirers desist from engaging in search, there is likely to follow less than 
optimum monitoring, leading to a potential decrease in the efficiency of corporate 
management.37  In the result, shareholder and social welfare are certain to be diminished. 
2.1.2 Current law raises the cost of takeovers. 
More seriously, by facilitating the entry of rival bidders, current law potentially raises the 
financial cost of takeovers.  Indeed, this issue was eloquently highlighted by CLERP when it 
observed that:38
by generally precluding control from changing hands other than 
during a bid, the takeover provisions facilitate auctions for 
corporate control.  In particular, the provisions requiring . . . 
minimum offer periods and a minimum period between the 
announcement and opening of an offer make it possible for 
other parties to contest the bid by offering a higher price. 
It is maintained by some that the auction process enhances shareholder welfare and so should 
be fostered.  Adherents of this view point out that competing bids operate as a cost free 
bargaining mechanism for offeree shareholders, enabling them to earn a higher premium 
 
34 See generally Little, above, n 9 at 45. .  For an interesting discussion of the free-rider problem 
generally, see S Levmore, ‘Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings’ (1982) 92 
Yale Law Review 49. 
35 The problem of competing bids is treated in more detail in Part 4.1 below. 
36 See R Gilson, 'Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense' (1982) 35 
Stanford Law Review 51 at 62 
37 Winsen, above, n 7 at 103. 
38 CLERP, above, n 1 at 15 and 20. 
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without incurring any bargaining costs.39  Indeed, this argument has been used with telling 
effect by some parties opposed to changing the present regulatory regime.40  For example, in 
his speech during the Senate debate on the mandatory bid rule, Senator Conroy said:41
The opposition understands the arguments for the mandatory 
bid proposal . . . But it comes at a cost that is more than the 
opposition is willing to risk. . . . No longer will there be an 
appropriate competitive regime for corporate control and, 
despite the proposed safeguards, shareholders will not get a 
better price than that obtained from an auction process. 
Although an auction might benefit offeree shareholders in the short term, it is likely to work 
counter to their long term interests.  We learn from economic theory that an increase in price 
is likely to cause demand for a commodity to fall.42  By significantly raising the financial cost 
of acquiring control, auctions reduce the profitability of corporate control transactions.  
Eroding the potential profits of prospective bidders is likely to reduce the incentive to attempt 
acquisitions.  As Grossman and Hart have rightly observed, ‘no raid will take place if a 
bidder is to pay at least as much for the firm’s shares as they are worth to him.’43  The 
prospect of a bidding war is thus likely to dampen the enthusiasm of many prospective 
bidders.44  It is an observed fact that ‘some persons are reluctant to commit the necessary 
time, effort and expense to make a bid if they believe that it will be used as a “stalking horse” 
 
39 See for example Bebchuk, above, n 14 at 1039-1041;  Gilson, above, n 7 at 868-875;  L A Bebchuk, 
'The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension' (1982) 35 Stanford Law 
Review 23;  M Gillen, 'Economic Efficiency and Takeover Bid Regulation' (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 919 at 931-9;  G R Andre, 'Tender Offers For Corporate Control: A Critical Analysis and 
Proposals for Reform' (1987) 12 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 865 at 905-6. 
40 See for example The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Joint Statutory 
Committee on Corporations and Securities, above, n 14, at para 2.34-5;  Commonwealth of Australia, 
Hansard, above, n 12, at 9650 – 9653. 
41 Commonwealth of Australia, Hansard, above, n 12, at 9650. 
42 See for example McTaggart et al, Economics, 4th edition 2003, Addison Wesley, Frenchs Forest at 48 
et seq;  N G Mankiw, Principles of Economics, The Dryden Press, Sydney, 1998, at 63-5;  K E Case & 
R C Fair, Principles of Economics, 4th edition 1996, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, at 76-9. 
43 See generally Little, above, n 9 at 45;  Grossman & Hart, above, n 18 at 45. 
44 Gutman, above, n 31 at 632. 
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to obtain higher bids.’45   If initial bids are not forthcoming, shareholders whom the law seeks 
to protect will, instead, lose out.  Social welfare will also likely be diminished. 
2.1.3 Current law facilitates resistance by incumbent directors. 
Apart from facilitating the entry of rival bidders into the contest, extended delay also gives 
target management an opportunity to organise and set in place defensive mechanisms to 
thwart any takeover offer unacceptable to them.46  The spectre of resistance increases the 
risks of the bidder’s intentions ultimately being frustrated by incumbent management.  
Indeed, based on the findings of studies conducted by himself and others, Eddey has asserted 
that ‘if target directors . . . actively defend against a bid, then the probability of the bid being 
successful is low.’47  In fact, there are innumerable instances in Australia where incumbent 
directors have successfully resisted unsolicited takeover overtures.  The fear of being 
frustrated, perhaps for irrelevant considerations, is likely to chill the incentive of some 
prospective acquirers to engage in search or be the first bidder.48
It thus appears that the results of the current regulatory regime are most unfortunate.  By 
promoting prolonged delay, it introduces uncertainty into takeover transactions, thereby 
rendering acquisition attempts more risky than they need be.  Further, it raises the cost and, 
 
45 Revlon Inc v Macandrews & Forbes Holdings 506 A 2D 173 (1986) at 183.  See further Arthur Yates 
& Co Ltd [2001] NSWSC 40;  Hanson Trust plc v ML SCM Acquisitions Inc 781 F 2d 264 (1986); at 
281;  Jewel Companies Inc v Pay Less Drug Store North West 741 F 2d 1555 (1984) at 1563;  Davies, 
above, n 7 at 786;  S M Bainbridge ‘Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-ups in Negotiated 
Corporate Acquisitions’ (1990) 75 Minnesota Law Review 239 at 317;  K J Nachbar, ‘Revlon Inc v 
Macandrews & Forbes Holdings Inc – The Requirement of a Level Playing Field in Contested 
Mergers, and its Effect on Lock-ups and Other Bidding Deterrents’ [1987] 12 Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law 473. 
46 This matter is discussed in more detail in Part 4.5 below. 
47 P H Eddey, ‘Corporate Raiders and Takeover Targets’ (1991) 18 Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting 151 at 164-5.  See also Little, above, n 9 at 526. 
48 On this see further M Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners - The Political Roots of American 
Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994 at 152;  Winsen, above, n 
7 at 94. 
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consequently, reduces the profitability of hostile takeover transactions.  These factors are 
likely to operate as significant disincentives to takeover activity.  Given the important role 
that the hostile takeover process plays in promoting shareholder and social welfare, it is 
desirable to reform the current regulatory regime to minimise its undesirable effects.  
Otherwise, potential bidders may be constrained to resort to alternative acquisition methods.  
Indeed, there is some evidence of this already happening.  In the recent past, there has been a 
noticeable increase in the use of schemes of arrangement to effect acquisitions of corporate 
control.  There is a distinct possibility that this can be attributed to the difficulties engendered 
by the current takeover procedure.49  If this trend persists, shareholders and society generally 
will increasingly be denied the benefits of takeover activity.50
3 IMPROVING THE LAW: THE PROMISE OF THE MANDATORY BID 
RULE 
If introduced, a mandatory bid rule, such as that proposed by CLERP, can significantly 
improve the operation of the market for corporate control in Australia.  This is likely to 
benefit of both investors in Australian companies and society generally.  The following 
discussion seeks to demonstrate this. 
 
49 On the use of the scheme of arrangement as an alternative acquisition strategy see H A J Ford et al, 
Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, 11th ed 2003, Lexisnexis Butterworths, Sydney, para 24.020 
(at 1100-01) and para 24.060 (at 1107-8);  A Colla, ‘Schemes of Arrangement as an Alternative to 
Friendly Takeover Schemes: Recent Developments’ (1998) 16 C & SLJ 365 especially at 379-380. 
50 On this see further ‘Arranged Marriage:  Are Schemes of Arrangement Being Used to Bring Parties 
Together Against Their Will?  [2003] Australian Corporate News 173.  This Note documents a case 
where a scheme of arrangement was recently used to acquire a company despite the strong opposition 
of many shareholders over the offer price.  Here, HBOS, a 57% shareholder in BankWest, bid $4.25 a 
share to acquire the bank’s remaining shares.  The offer price was only slightly higher than the stock’s 
market price, which was then hovering around $4.20 per share.  The transaction succeeded, despite the 
misgivings of many shareholders who variously described the offer price as ‘parsimonious’ and 
‘stingy’ (see [2003] Australian Corporate News 173 at 174).  It is probable that if the acquisition had 
proceeded by way of a takeover offer, shareholders would have been able to earn a more substantial 
premium.  Whilst there is no general agreement on this point, it is generally believed that a premium of 
at least 25% must be offered for any takeover offer to stand a chance of success - see for example 
Bishop et al, above, n 7, at 26;  Lonergan, above, n 9 at 338. 
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3.1 The rule promotes speed in the conclusion of hostile takeover transactions. 
A mandatory bid rule, of the nature recommended by CLERP, enables acquirers to conclude 
hostile takeover transactions with speed and in privacy, as desired.  To this extent, the rule 
assists to overcome most of the risks discussed before.51  Most significantly, it assures 
bidders of success.52  By improving the chances of success of hostile acquisitions, the rule is 
likely to encourage prospective acquirers to undertake more search for takeover targets.  An 
increase in the level of search is, in turn, likely to create a degree certain of fear among 
corporate management and induce them to perform with greater efficiency.53  The rule is thus 
likely to serve as ‘an engine of corporate accountability.’54  As Professor Coffee Jr has 
observed:55
the constant search for . . . discounted bargains both motivates 
the managements of marginal firms towards increasing 
performance lest they become targets, and deters conduct 
injurious to shareholders – all without the need for regulatory 
intervention. 
To the extent that this is achieved, shareholder and social welfare will likely be enhanced. 
3.2 The rule encourages the assembly of strategic control blocs. 
If implemented, the proposed mandatory bid rule would remove the prohibition against the 
acquisition of corporate control in private, off-market transactions presently in force.  This 
can benefit shareholders in a very important respect.  It is likely to encourage the assembly of 
strategic control blocs and consequently assist in reducing the agency costs of management.  
 
51 See generally the discussion in the preceding part of this article. 
52 See further Colla, above, n 49 at 379-380. 
53 See discussion accompanying note 18 above. 
54 J C Coffee Jr, 'Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender 
Offer's Role in Corporate Governance' (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1145 at 1156. 
55 Ibid, at 1155. 
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It is well known that one of the quintessential characteristics of the modern large company is 
dispersed shareholders with small holdings and concentrated management.56  This ownership 
structure leads to a collective action problem.57  With fragmented shareholders typically 
owning only small holdings, no individual shareholder has a large enough incentive to devote 
resources to ensuring that management are acting in the interest of the shareholders.58  This 
has the potential to make directors less accountable in a way that can hurt shareholders.59  
Indeed, in their seminal work, The Modern Corporation And Private Property, published in 
1932, Berle and Means asserted that the direct consequence of the ownership structure of 
modern large firms was to release management from the overriding requirement that it serve 
its stockholders.60  They further opined that:61
the concentration of economic power separate from ownership 
has, in fact, created economic empires, and has delivered these 
empires into the hands of a new despotism, relegating the new 
owners to the position of those who supply the means whereby 
the new princes may exercise their power. 
By facilitating the emergence of holders of control blocs (perhaps where there was none 
before) the mandatory bid rule can assist to overcome the collective action problems that 
 
56 Roe, above, n 48 at 4. 
57 Ibid, at 6. 
58 Ibid, at xiii.  See also Grossman & Hart, above, n 18 at 42;  I Ayres & P Cramton, ‘Relational 
Investing and Agency Theory’ (1994) 15 Cardozo Law Review 1033 at 1043-4;  G P Stapledon, 
Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, at 9-11. 
59 Roe, above, n 48 at 8.  See also T A Paredes, ‘The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of 
Takeover Law’ (October 16, 2003). Washington U School of Law Working Paper No. 03-10-03. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=507762 (date accessed 23 April 2004) at 107-9. 
60 A A Berle & G C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Revised edition 1967, 
Harcourt & World Inc, New York, at xxxv. 
61 Ibid, at 116.  See also Easterbrook & Fischel, above, n 7 at 701 et seq;  Easterbrook, & Fischel, above, 
n 19 at 1171;  Mandelbaum, above, n 7 at 205-6;  Gilson, above, n 7 at 833-7  Grossman & Hart, 
above, n 18 at 42;  V Brudney, ‘Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control' 
(1966) 65 Michigan Law Review 259 at 260 et seq;  Council of Economic Advisers, ‘The Market for 
Corporate Control' in T Calvani & J Siegfried, Economic Analysis and Antitrust Law, Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston, 2nd ed 1988  at 287-8. 
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make small shareholders passive.62  Large bloc owners have both the incentive and ability to 
monitor management performance.63  Because of this, they can influence corporate 
management and reduce the agency costs of corporate governance.64  Out of self-interest, 
large shareholders keep a watchful eye open in order to safeguard their interest.  This 
provides an incentive to management to adopt policies in the interest of shareholders.  True, 
large investors do not normally interfere with purely managerial decisions.65  Ordinarily, they 
follow the Wall Street Rule.  They simply liquidate their holdings if dissatisfied with 
management performance.66  All the same, as Pennington rightly observed, 'institutional 
investors are known to have certain predilections on general issues which directors are 
careful not to flout.’67  Management are only too aware that if large investors disapprove of 
their conduct of a company's affairs, they will express their dissatisfaction by selling their 
holdings, which might result in management losing their positions and perquisites.  This is 
likely to inspire management to improve their performance. 
By encouraging the assembly of control blocs, the mandatory bid rule likely provides a better 
monitor of incumbent management.  This benefits the company and all shareholders.68  The 
 
62 See further Bhagat et al, ‘Relational Investing and Firm Performance’ Journal of Financial Research, 
Vol. 27, pp. 1-30, 2004   http://ssrn.com/abstract=391262 (date accessed 23 April 2004) at 5.  See also 
Mannolini, above, n 3 at 213;  J Hill, ‘Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance in Australia’ in 
Baums et al (eds), Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1994 
at 597;  Ayres & Cramton, above, n 58 at 1041;  S J Choi, ‘Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital 
Markets’  U C Berkely . School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 59 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=276639 (date accessed 30 April 2004) at 15-6. 
63 Bhagat et al, above, n 62 at 13.  See also Berglof & Burkart, above, n 7 at 191;  Hill, above, n 62 at 
597;  Mannolini, above, n 3 at 213. 
64 Roe, above, n 48 at xiv. 
65 This phenomenon is evidently still prevalent in Australia today, as recent findings on the voting trends 
of the largest shareholders in Australian companies indicate.  See, for example, Mannolini, above, n 3 
at 197;  Stapledon, above, n 58 at 253;  F Buffini, ‘Institutions Still Loath to Use Voting Power’ The 
Australian Financial Review, 11 March 2004, at 5. 
66 Easterbrook & Fischel, above, n 19 at 1171;  Andre, above, n 39 at 867;  Stapledon, above, n 58 at 128 
and 257. 
67 R R Pennington, The Investor and the Law, Macgibbon & Kee, London, 1968 at 411.  See also Hill, 
above, n 62 at 600;  P Redmond, 'The Reform of Directors' Duties' (1992) 15 UNSWLJ 86 at 92-3. 
68 Coffee Jr, above, n 54, at 1284. 
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process of monitoring by large shareholders poses a continuous threat of takeover if 
performance lags.  In order to reduce the chances of takeover, managers will endeavour to 
pursue policies that favour the company, leading to a reduction in agency costs.69  Indeed, it 
has been argued that the value of a firm increases when an investor takes a large-block 
position.70
Further, in addition to promoting enhanced monitoring of management performance, the 
assembly of control blocs is likely to raise the probability of success of value-enhancing 
takeovers.  It has been postulated that where shares in a company the subject of a takeover 
bid are widely held, small shareholders have no incentive to tender their shares.  These 
shareholders, believing that the bid will succeed without their participation, are likely to hold 
on to their shares, hoping to benefit from a change in management, in the expectation that 
sufficient other shareholders will accept the offer.71  This phenomenon has the potential to 
lead to the frustration of a takeover bid through non-acceptance.  On the other hand, holders 
of control blocs do recognise that without their participation, a bid may fail.  They thus have 
an incentive to seek out and accept value-enhancing bids.72  The existence of holders of 
strategic control blocs is thus likely to facilitate more takeovers relative to a company with 
dispersed shareholders.73
 
69 Easterbrook & Fischel, above, n 19 at 1174. 
70 Bhagat et al, above, n 62 at 8 (citing Mikkelsen and Rubac);  Ayres & Cramton, above, n 58 at 1049 
(citing Shleifer and Vishny). 
71 See generally Grossman & Hart, above, n 18 at 44-7. 
72 Id.  See also Ayres & Cramton, above, n 58 at 1042-3. 
73 Id.  See also Berglof & Burkart, above, n 7 at 185. 
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3.3 The rule assists to reduce the financial cost of takeovers. 
In a very erudite article published in the influential Columbia Law Review, Professor Coffee 
Jr counselled that:74
the more the law can reduce the tender offer premium necessary 
to secure working control of the target corporation, the easier 
and more frequent hostile takeovers will become, thereby 
reducing agency costs and increasing shareholder wealth. 
A mandatory bid rule can play a crucial role in attaining the objective checking the level of 
premium payable upon a transfer of corporate control.  That rule enables an offeror to acquire 
control of a company before other bidders have had time to advance a competing bid.  The 
auction process is effectively eliminated.75  By enabling bidders to retain more of the gains 
from takeover transactions, the rule is likely to provide more incentives to bidders to attempt 
acquisitions. 
4 OPPOSITION TO THE MANDATORY BID RULE 
Whilst it appears that a mandatory bid rule could significantly improve the functioning of the 
market for corporate, to the benefit of shareholders and society in general, there is some 
anxiety in certain influential quarters that it could also harm the interests of investors in 
Australian companies.  As a result, the introduction of the rule has, at least for the time being, 
been deferred.  It is thus important to evaluate and rebut the criticisms levelled at the rule.  
That forms the task of this Part. 
4.1 The rule is likely to lead to a reduction in shareholder wealth. 
 
74 Coffee Jr, above, n 54, at 1154. 
75 As to why this is desirable, see the discussion in Part 4.1 below. 
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The opinion has been expressed that ‘an efficient mechanism for discovering the highest 
price that a buyer will pay for a controlling stake in a target company requires informed 
competition between prospective buyers.’76  However, a mandatory bid rule has potential to 
deny shareholders the benefit of an auction for their shares.  As CLERP forthrightly 
recognised in its discussion paper:77
 under a mandatory bid, control could pass prior to the making 
of a formal takeover bid.  This would preclude rival bids and the 
opportunity for an auction for control.  An auction facilitates 
price competition in the market by compelling a bidder to pay 
an amount at least as high as others are, or might be, willing to 
pay.  In the absence of this competition, it is argued that bidders 
may acquire targets for a lower premium, harming the interests 
of target shareholders by depriving them of the ‘true’ value of 
their shares. 
Because it is likely to prevent shareholders from receiving the highest possible price for their 
shares, it is considered by some that a mandatory bid rule is undesirable.  It potentially 
diminishes shareholder wealth.78  Indeed, this is one of the most powerful arguments 
commonly advanced in opposition to its introduction.79  To these critics, no acquisition 
should occur before other bidders have had time to advance a competing bid.  That way, 
takeover offer premiums will be maximised.80
 
76 J Philips, ‘CLERP’s Mandatory Bid Proposal: the Costs of Locking Out Competition’  (1997) 24 BCLB 
[375].  See also T Greenwod, ‘The Follow on Rule and Implications of the CLERP Legislation’ paper 
presented at the Corporate Law Workshop of the Business Council of Australia, 11-13 September 1998 
(unpublished – copy on file with author).  Mr Greenwood laments (at p25) that with a mandatory bid 
rule, ‘market competition for controlling shares is to be trashed’. 
77 CLERP, above, n 1 at 21 (notes omitted). 
78 See, for example, Bebchuk, above, n 14 especially at 1038-41. 
79 See for example the Commonwealth of Australia, Hansard, above, n 12 at 9650-1 (per Sen Conroy) 
and at 9652 (per Sen Murray);  Philips, above, n 76;  Levy & Patrick, above, n 3 at 424;  B Frith, ‘Fix 
the Bidding or Bin it Again’  The Australian, 4 April 2003 at 18. 
80 Andre, above, n 39 at 906;  Bebchuk, above, n 14 at 1038. 
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It is acknowledged that ‘to the extent that auctions raise the takeover premium, they 
obviously reduce the possibility of exploitation of the target’s shareholders.’81  From this 
point view, ‘ex post competition will always be desirable.’82  However, as already argued, 
from a social welfare point of view, the law should endeavour to increase the chances of 
takeovers occurring as this makes current management very efficient.83  This is likely to 
happen if the cost of acquiring control of a company is lower than its expected value to the 
bidder.84  It thus appears that measures which promote auctions are not necessarily desirable.  
By driving up the offer premium that must be paid for corporate control, competitive bids 
may discourage raids from ever taking place.85  It is well known that ‘demand curves almost 
invariably slope down to the right.’86  Thus, it is evident that any increase in the expected 
cost of acquiring control is certain to ‘generally discourage prospective bidders for others 
targets; when the price of anything goes up, the quantity demanded falls.’87  Fewer hostile 
takeover offers will be made.  So, if the law insists on achieving very high takeover premia, 
the result is likely to be a sacrifice in the level of takeover activity, leading to reduced 
managerial efficiency.88  Indeed, this much has been recognised by the City Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers, the principal regulator of takeover activity in the United Kingdom.  
Its Code does not seek to promote competitive bidding.  Explaining the reason for this 
approach, Sir Alexander Johnston, a former Deputy Chair of the Panel said:89
 
81 Coffee Jr, above, n 54 at 1174. 
82 Grossman & Hart, above, n 18 at 58. 
83 Ibid, at 60. 
84 Ibid, at 46. 
85 Coffee Jr, above, n 54 at 1176;  Grossman Hart, above, n 18 at 58. 
86 Coffee Jr, above, n 54 at 1176;  Mankiw, above, n 42 at 76-9. 
87 See generally the works cited in note 42 above;  Easterbrook & Fischel, above, n 19 at 1176;  Coffee Jr, 
above, n 54 at 1176;  Mannolini, above, n 3 at 203-4. 
88 On this, see further Grossman & Hart, above, n 18 at 53;  Mannolini, above, n 3 at 204. 
89 Sir Alexander Johnston, The City Take-Over Code, Oxford University Press, 1980 at 104. 
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if the code insisted on what might seem to be a public auction of 
the company, a potential offeror willing to offer good terms 
might find this prospect unattractive and go away: and then all 
concerned would be losers. 
Apart from raising the financial cost of acquiring corporate control, auctions are undesirable 
for another important consideration.  It has been observed that the first bidder generally loses 
in a competitive bidding contest.90  Indeed available studies indicate that the initial bidder 
loses in 75% of the cases when a second bid is made.91  It has also been established that when 
a corporate bidder loses a control contest and the target is instead captured by a rival firm the 
losing bidder’s stock declines significantly.92  Truly, ‘to a management concerned with 
maximizing its firm’s stock value, this is a substantial disincentive. . . Not only are the odds 
high that it will fail to obtain control but there is strong empirical evidence that its own share 
value will fall in the wake of its defeat in a control contest over the target.93  This is likely to 
operate as a potent disincentive for a prospective acquirer to initiate a control contest.  As 
Professor Winsen warned sometime back, ‘if in an auction market the second bidder 
consistently wins, there may be inadequate incentives for the first bidder to make the initial 
offer that starts the contest, hence the auction market might collapse.’94  This does not augur 
well for shareholders. 
Further, in considering whether auctions are good for shareholders, it is essential to take 
account of the fact that quite often competing bidders are able to offer more than the initial 
offeror because they may not have incurred search costs.  In any event, it has been observed 
that the price paid by competing offerors is often only slightly higher than that offered by the 
 
90 Coffee Jr, above, n 54 at 1289. 
91 Ibid, at 1178. 
92 Id. 
93 Ibid, at 1289.  See also The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Joint 
Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities, above, n 14, at para 2.31-2. 
94 Coffee Jr, above, n 54, at 1281. 
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original bidder.95  Thus, the gains from competing offers may not be very large.  However, 
the loss sustained when initial bids are discouraged may be substantial.96  In this connection, 
Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Company Limited (No 2) provides an excellent 
illustration.97
In this case, a cash takeover offer of $10 per share was made for all the outstanding shares in 
the respondent company.  The last recorded trading price of those shares prior to this offer 
was 0.87 cents.  Thus, as Kirby P (as he then was) observed, the offer represented ‘a tenfold 
increase in the value of the shares over their last sale'.98  The directors of the target company 
promoted a competing offer claiming, among other things, that they wished to secure a higher 
price for the shareholders.99  This led to the frustration of the original offer.  However, the 
competing offer was made at $11 per share, representing a gain of a mere 10% over the 
original offer.100  It is not difficult to see that this scenario is likely to discourage initial bids, 
to the disadvantage of shareholders. 
It is thus imperative to ensure that in the endeavour to secure high takeover prices, the law 
does not stymie desirable takeover activity.  This could limit the disciplinary and resource 
allocation roles of hostile takeover bids,101 and a consequent reduction in shareholder and 
social welfare.  Therefore, it is important to resist the allure of competing bids.  Very clearly, 
as Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argued in their penetrating analysis of the utility of 
 
95 Winsen, above, n 7 at 95 (quoting Grossman & Hart). 
96 Ibid, at 95-6. 
97 (1989) 7 ACLC 659 (NSW Court of Appeal). 
98 Ibid, at 665. 
99 See generally Ibid, at 702-4. 
100 For a detailed discussion of this decision see R Baxt, ‘Second Guessing Directors' Decisions on 
Takeovers - A Mixed Message From the New South Wales Court of Appeal' (1990) 8 C&SLJ 26; 
N Rogers, ‘When Can Target Directors Legitimately Frustrate a Takeover Bid’ (1994) 12 C&SLJ 207 
at 212-213.  For a review of the lower court decision, see J Mayanja, ‘Defending Against Hostile 
Takeovers: Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Company Limited & Others' (1988) 14 MULR 231. 
101 Grossman & Hart, above, n 18 at 53. 
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competitive biding ‘any approach that looks only at the way in which managers can augment 
the tender offeror’s bid given that a tender offer has already been made, but disregards the 
effect of a . . . strategy on the number of offers that will be made in the future and the way in 
which the number of offers affect the efficiency with which corporations are managed, 
ignores much that is relevant to shareholders’ welfare.’102
Finally, it is significant to note that it has been observed in the United Kingdom that even 
without auctions, there is no evidence that the best price is not obtained in corporate control 
transactions.103  There is nothing to suggest that the conditions prevailing in Australia are 
radically different from those obtaining in the United Kingdom.  This makes the argument 
that it is essential to have competitive bidding as a means of ensuring that shareholders secure 
the highest possible price that much weaker. 
4.2 The rule will disadvantage shareholders where the selling controlling 
shareholder is in a distressed state. 
While still on the question of price, critics of the mandatory bid rule have further argued that 
in the absence of competing bids, the price available to shareholders may not be maximised 
in cases of distressed sales.104
This criticism can be disposed of easily.  Under the proposed rule, following the acquisition 
of a controlling interest, an offer would need to be made to the remaining shareholders not at 
the price paid to the owner or owners of the control parcels, but at the highest price paid over 
 
102 Easterbrook & Fischel, above, n 19 at 1164. 
103 Testimony of Mr P Lee, of the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, to the Parliamentary Joint 
Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities.  See The Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities, above, n 14, at para 
2.13. 
104 See the Commonwealth of Australia, Hansard, above, n 12 at  9651 (per Sen Conroy);  Mannolini, 
above, n 3 at 212;  Levy & Patrick, above, n 3 at 426;  R Levy, ‘Pre-Bid Stake Building’  (2001) 19 
C&SLJ 205. 
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the preceding four months by the acquirer for shares in the target company.105  This should 
dispel the concern that remaining shareholders will necessarily be disadvantaged if the selling 
controlling shareholder’s main objective is not to obtain the best possible price.  The rule 
contains within it a mechanism – the highest price principle - to ensure that minority 
shareholders receive an equitable price.  In any event, it is important not to forget, in the 
words of Grossmann and Hart that ‘there is a real trade off between achieving a high tender 
price and inducing managerial efficiency, shareholders pursuit of the former leads to a 
(partial) sacrifice of the latter.’106  Indeed, it has been asserted that ‘to foster efficiency, a 
takeover mechanism must grant to bidders benefits that do not accrue to other shareholders 
on a pro-rata basis.’107  If the mandatory bid rule assists to lower the price payable on a 
transfer of corporate control, and thereby induces more takeover activity, leading to improved 
managerial performance, so much the better.  As Hertig and McCahery have advised, one of 
the objectives of policy makers should be to promote policies that make takeovers less costly 
and thus produce more bids.108
4.3 The rule is likely to diminish allocative efficiency. 
Apart from the shareholder welfare concerns discussed above, proponents of the competitive 
auction process also seek to discredit the mandatory bid rule on grounds of social welfare. 
The argument is put that the auction process helps to ensure that the target is acquired by the 
 
105 See Corporate Law Economic Reform Bill, s 611, item 5. 
106 Grossman & Hart, above, n 18 at 53. 
107 Berglof & Burkart, above, n 7 at 182. 
108 G Hertig & J A McCahery,  ‘Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe:  Misguided 
Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition?’  (August 2003). ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 
12/2003.  http://ssrn.com/abstract=438421, (date accessed 9 April 2004) at 24. 
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firm that values it the most.109  This ostensibly benefits society by ensuring that the target's 
assets are shifted their most productive uses, thereby promoting allocation efficiency.110
This argument is certainly respectable.  There can be no doubt that the interest of society lies 
in scarce societal resources being put to their highest valued uses.  However, this argument 
fails to appreciate that quite often, competing offers come about because someone is taking a 
free ride on information generated by the first bidder.  As argued before, free riding of this 
sort is undesirable.111  It reduces the incentive to undertake search and make the first offer.  
In the long run, the amount of monitoring is reduced and the number of offers decreases.  
This is likely to harm, rather than promote, shareholder and social welfare.112
4.4 The rule is likely to extinguish the role of directors in contests for corporate 
control. 
Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act, which regulates takeover activity, has as its objective to 
ensure, among other things, that:113
(a) the shareholders and directors of a company know the 
identity of the person who proposes to acquire a 
substantial interest in the company; 
(b) the shareholders and directors of a company have a 
reasonable time in which to consider any proposal under 
which a person would acquire a substantial interest in 
the company; 
 
109 See for example Andre, above, n 39 at 906. 
110 Gilson, above, n 36 at 62;  Bebchuk, above, n 14 at 1048-1050;  Coffee Jr, above, n 54 at 1145 and 
1280 et seq. 
111 See discussion in Part 2.1.2 above. 
112 Easterbrook & Fischel, above, n 19 at 1189. 
113 See Corporations Act (Cth) 2001, s602(b). 
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However, if implemented, the proposed mandatory bid rule would change this position and, 
instead, make it possible for a bidder to acquire control of a company without first declaring 
its intentions to the directors of the target company.114  For this reason, the proposal has also 
been roundly criticised.  In particular, it has been said that the rule would work contrary to 
the interests of minority shareholders to the extent it would deny them the benefit of their 
directors’ advice in transactions involving the transfer of control of their company.115  
Indeed, commenting on this particular aspect of the rule, Senator Conroy said:116
The mandatory bid rule . . . would go against the Eggleston 
principles . . . It is important to reiterate what those Eggleston 
principles are. . . The Eggleston principles require: that 
shareholders of a target takeover company know the identity of 
any person that proposes to acquire a substantial interest in the 
company;  that target shareholders and directors have sufficient 
time to consider the offer; . . . The mandatory bid rule breaks 
these principles. 
With respect, the involvement of the directors of the target company in the takeover process 
is not desirable.117  A hostile takeover offer presents target directors with a potential conflict 
of interest.118   ‘Managers of the target perceive bids as reflecting poorly on their services, 
 
114 As to this effect of the proposed rule see generally Sen Conroy’s speech in Commonwealth of 
Australia, Hansard, above, n 12 at 9651. 
115 See The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on 
Corporations and Securities, above, n 14, at para 2.22. .  See also T O’loughlin, ‘Lawyers Warn on 
Mandatory Bids’  The Australian, 20 March 2000, at 25. 
116 See the Commonwealth of Australia, Hansard, above, n 12 at 9651 
117 The discussion in this Part has benefited substantially from my article ‘Directors' Duties, Business 
Judgment and Takeover Defences:  Agenda for Reform’ (1997) 10 CBLJ 39 at 53-4. 
118 M A Weinberg & M V Blank, Takeovers and Mergers, 5th ed 1989, Sweet & Maxwell, London, at 
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since the bidder proposes to change the way the target is run.'119  Further, with the success of 
a hostile takeover offer, the incumbent directors often stand to lose their positions and 
perquisites.  Faced with a hostile takeover bid then, ‘there is a great danger that the directors 
will channel their expertise toward pursuit of personal advantage,'120 in conflict with their 
duty to act in best interests of the company.121  By allowing target directors a role in 
determining the outcome of a hostile takeover offer,122 current law significantly weakens the 
protection of the interests of the company and its shareholders.  The directors are given 
sufficient scope to take action to block a transfer of control unacceptable to them.  Current 
law thus potentially serves as an instrument of directorial entrenchment and works contrary to 
the objective of promoting accountability and efficiency.  Since ‘there is no signal that 
separates intransigent resistance from honest efforts to act for the shareholder’s benefit,123 the 
directors can resolve to resist a takeover attempt in furtherance of their own parochial 
interests.  The directors ‘may try to resist - whether crassly to save their jobs or because they 
genuinely believe that their program is superior to the bidder's.'124  Or they may act so as to 
facilitate the company to be acquired by a bidder that promises not oust them from their 
 
119 F H Easterbrook & D R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Massachusetts, 1991 at 162. 
120 Johnson v Trueblood 629 F 2d 287 at 300 (per Rosenn J).  See also Little, above, n 9 at 525; 
R J Gilson, ‘Unocal Fifteen Year Later (and What We Can Do About It)’ Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 491-513 http://ssrn.com/abstract=333041 (date accessed 23 April 
2004) at 495. 
121 See generally Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Limited [1900] 1Ch 656;  The Australian Metropolitan 
Life Assurance Company Limited v Ure (1923) 33 CLR 199;  Re Smith & Fawcett Limited [1942] 2 Ch 
304, 306;  Pergamon Press Limited v Maxwell [1970] 2 All E R 809; Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 
at 185-186; Ampol Petroleum Limited v R W Miller (Holdings) Limited [1972] 2 NSWLR 850. 
122 As presently interpreted, the fiduciary standard, which governs the duties of directors in takeover 
situations, gives target management wide scope to adopt measures to repel any unsolicited takeover 
bid.  As to this, see generally The Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Company Limited v Ure 
(1923) 33 CLR 199;  Harlowe's Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil NL (1968-69) 42 
ALJR 123;  Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Company Limited (No 2) (1989) 7 ACLC 659. 
123 Easterbrook & Fischel, above, n 19 at 1178. 
124 Easterbrook & Fischel, above n 119 at 162.  See also Berglof & Burkart, above, n 7 at 195. 
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positions after the merger, or to confer on them extra side benefits, rather than one offering 
the best terms.125
The proposed mandatory bid rule goes a long way in overcoming these difficulties.  It 
effectively ensures that target directors, who may be ineffective, cannot take any action to 
insulate themselves from removal from office.  Neither can they act to facilitate control to 
pass to a friendly party, thereby promoting an inefficient transfer of corporate control.  For 
achieving this, the initiative should be welcomed. 
5 SOME PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
While seeking to protect shareholders against fraudulent, coercive or manipulative practices, 
the law ought to avoid creating barriers to takeover activity unless it can be shown that the 
benefits of such constraints outweigh the costs. 
Through the legislative provisions which prohibit prospective acquirers from concluding 
hostile takeover transactions as quickly as possible,126 current law renders takeovers more 
risky to mount.  It promotes free riding.  It gives target firms time and room to manoeuvre 
and organise resistance.  It facilitates competing bids, thus raising the cost of takeovers.  It 
raises the chances of premature leakage of sensitive commercial information, attenuating, in 
the process, the property rights of searchers.  These factors are likely to reduce the incentive 
to engage in search for takeover targets and be the first bidder.127  This is bound to weaken 
the disciplinary, allocative and wealth creating roles of the hostile takeover process.  To assist 
shareholders and society generally to reap the significant benefits of hostile takeover activity, 
it is imperative to reform the law.  This reform should have as its objective to encourage 
 
125 American Law Institute, above, n 7 at 385;  Bainbridge, above, n 45 at 272-5;  Berglof & Burkart, 
above, n 7 at 195. 
126 As to these see the discussion in Part 2 above. 
127 Winsen, above, n 7 at 94. 
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significant amounts of takeover activity.  To bring this about, the law needs to promote 
greater protection of the property rights of searchers by ensuring that they fully capture the 
returns from investing in information.  As well, it should endeavour to facilitate the transfer 
of corporate control at the lowest possible cost.128
5.1 Free-rider, cost and related problems. 
A rule which permits a bidder to purchase a control block from a private party without first 
making an offer to all shareholders (the mandatory bid rule) can assist to achieve these 
objectives and consequently improve the functioning of the market for corporate control.129  
Therefore, the law governing takeover activity in Australia should be reformed to introduce 
such a rule, as recommended by CLERP.  Evidently, that rule is bound to have implications 
with respect to competitive bidding and, ultimately, the level of the takeover premium 
payable on a transfer of corporate control.  With respect to this, the law should leave it to 
shareholders themselves to determine the level of protection they wish.130  Shareholders of a 
company are better informed as to their needs in this respect.131  Those who wish high 
premiums should be free to include provisions in their constitution to achieve this.  A 
properly drafted provision in a company’s constitution can give effect to equal treatment, if 
desired.  A private solution regarding the distribution of the takeover premium is preferable 
to a legally mandated one.132  Because of the diversity of firms and investors, there can be no 
uniform optimal solution all the time.133  Some shareholders might prefer high premiums.  In 
 
128 See also Hertig & McCahery, above, n 108 at 24. 
129 For an exposition of some of the advantages of a mandatory bid rule, see the discussion in Part 3 above. 
130 The discussion in this section is adapted in part from my earlier article published in this journal on the 
equal opportunity principle.  See Mayanja, above, n 32 at 16-18. 
131 On this see further Mannolini, above, n 3 at 203-10 
132 See further L A Bebchuk, 'Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers' 
(1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 1693 at 1755-6. 
133 On this see generally Easterbrook & Fischel, above, n 119 at 166;  Dodd, & Officer, above, n 7 at 31;  
Dodd, above, n 7 at 13-14. 
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other cases, investors might well conclude that the value of their investment will be 
maximised by a system of lower premiums. 
The Corporations Act recognises that shareholders are capable of protecting themselves in 
corporate control transactions.  It leaves companies free to include shark-repellent provisions 
in their regulations, and so protect their shareholders against partial takeover bids.134  The 
same should be the case with respect to the level of premium.  Investors who do not want to 
take the risk of low premia would then be free to buy shares in companies with regulations 
that require an auction of the company in the event of a takeover. 
5.2 Other considerations. 
The mandatory bid rule as originally proposed is troublesome in some respects.  To remind 
ourselves, under the CLERP proposal, a bidder would be allowed to acquire in excess of 20% 
the voting shares of a company on condition that the acquirer announced immediately an 
unconditional cash offer for all the remaining voting shares in the company.  These 
conditions are designed to protect target shareholders.  The requirement that the follow on bid 
be unconditional is calculated to ensure that the bidder cannot insert in the offer self serving 
conditions which may enable it to get out of a bid.135  The obligation to offer cash, or a cash 
alternative of equivalent value if it is a scrip offer, is intended to enable interested 
shareholders to exit the company.136  However, these are quite onerous conditions, which are 
likely to reduce the utility of the original mandatory bid rule proposal.137  The proposed rule 
needs therefore to be refined in these respects. 
 
134 See Corporations Act 2000 (Cth), s 648D. 
135 M Button & S Bolton (eds),  A Practitioner’s Guide to The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, City 
& Financial Publishing, Surrey, 2001 at 109. 
136 Ibid, at 107;  Hertig & McCahery, above, n 108 at 27. 
137 See also Mannolini, above, n 3 at 212. 
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Because cash must always be offered, the rule will be used only if the prospective acquirer 
can mobilise sufficient funds to purchase all shares that might be tendered.  Needless to say, 
this is bound to inhibit some transactions which might otherwise be beneficial in cases where 
the prospective acquirer cannot muster the requisite funds readily.  If the mandatory bid rule 
is to have the desired effect of unleashing more takeover activity, it is advisable to remove 
this requirement from the rule. 
Also, it should not be forgotten that some acquisitions are proscribed unless otherwise 
sanctioned by certain prescribed authorities.  For example, the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth) prohibits a takeover if it would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market,138 unless the authorisation of the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission is first obtained.139  This measure is designed to 
prevent concentration in industry and commerce.140  In addition, several other legal and 
administrative initiatives have been implemented with a view to preventing the transfer of 
ownership of resources from Australian hands without the consent of the Commonwealth 
Treasurer.141  As well, there are several limitations on the participation of foreign interests in 
the control of local firms operating in certain sectors of the Australian economy.142  By 
requiring that a mandatory follow on bid must be unconditional, the original CLERP proposal 
renders participation in the takeover process by bidders who may require regulatory approval 
 
138 The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s50. 
139 The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s88(9).  See further Levy, above, n 25 at 61-6. 
140 Indeed, proposed takeovers have been successfully opposed on competition grounds in several cases.  
For a digest of these cases see generally R V Miller, Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act 1974, 25th 
ed 2004, Thomson Lawbook Co, Sydney, at 391-2. 
141 The Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth), s26.  See further Levy, above, n 25 at 58-61. 
142 See for example the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth), s 21A(2) (restrictions on the 
acquisition of urban land);  Broadcasting Act 1942 (Cth), sections 90G & 92D and Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992(Cth), s37 (restrictions on newspaper and electronic media ownership);  Treasury, 
Your Investment in Australia - A Guide For Investors, AGPS, Canberra, 1987 (restrictions on mineral 
extraction).  See further Levy, above, n 25 at 66-70. 
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more difficult.143  More seriously, it is apt to unnecessarily restrict the participation of foreign 
interests in takeover activity in Australia.144  This is so given especially that where a 
proposed takeover is opposed by some prescribed authority, the timetable for seeking and 
securing the necessary approval under the applicable law may not necessarily tie in with the 
time framework mandated by Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act for conducting takeovers.145 
Further, and quite importantly, it is important to bear in mind that the ‘national interest’ test 
applicable under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act and the others laws which 
impose limitations on foreign participation in local industry makes it difficult for prospective 
bidders to predict with certainty whether or not an application for clearance will, if made, be 
successful.  National interest has been applied variously to issues of economic benefit, the 
avoidance of monopoly and national security.146  This introduces a high degree of 
arbitrariness into the control of foreign takeovers. 
In discussing the potential effects of CLERP’s recommended rule, the experience of the 
United Kingdom, which too has a strict form of mandatory bid rule and on which the 
proposed Australia rule is modelled is quite instructive. There, the applicable rule requires a 
person who, through share acquisitions, reaches the threshold of 30% or more of the voting 
rights of a company to make an offer to acquire the remaining shares.147  The offer must be in 
cash or be accompanied by a cash alternative, and may not be made at any price lower than 
that paid in the previous 12 months.148  Also, the offer must be unconditional.149
 
143 See further Mannolini, above, n 3 at 211;  Greenwood, above, n 76 at 35. 
144 This is not the place for detailed examination of the merits or otherwise of regulating foreign control of 
Australian enterprise.  On this, interested readers may refer to J Mayanja, Reforming the Law to 
Improve the Market for Corporate Control, unpublished Ph D thesis, Monash University, 1993 at 39-
46;  D Bryan, Foreign Investment Policy Issues For Australia, Discussion Paper No 5, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1989;  M Sexton & A Adamovich, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Australia, CCH 
Australia Limited, Sydney, 1981. 
145 See further Greenwood, above, n 76 at 35. 
146 Bryan, above, n 144 at 4. 
147 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Rule 9. 
148 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Rule 9.5 
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It has been observed of this rule that one of its practical effects is to discourage a prospective 
acquirer from making a market purchase if it wants to maintain conditions to its offer, for 
example in circumstances where the consent or clearance of third parties is required.150  It has 
further been asserted that for this reason, rule 9 bids are rare in the UK.151  This undermines 
the utility of the U K mandatory bid rule as a means of promoting hostile takeover activity.  
Thus, in order to promote a more vigorous market for corporate control, it is prudent to 
rethink the CLERP proposal with regard to the permissibility of conditional bids in 
circumstances where regulatory approval is required.152
6 CONCLUSION 
A mandatory bid rule increases certainty of success of hostile takeover attempts.  It can also 
assist to lower the costs of takeover transactions.  By doing this, the rule increases the 
likelihood of takeovers occurring.  As such, the rule has the potential to stimulate more 
hostile takeover activity.  The likely benefits from such increased activity - more efficient 
management, more efficient allocation of resources within industries and increased 
shareholder wealth - are likely to far outweigh any loss resulting from reduced takeover 
premia caused by abandoning the present regulatory regime.  From a shareholder and social 
welfare point of view, therefore, it is advisable to introduce such a rule in Australia. 
 
149 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Rule 9.3.  See further Weinberg & Blank, , above, n 118 at 
para 3-934-5. 
150 See Button & Bolton, above, n 135 at 118. 
151 Id. 
152 Some drafting refinements may need to be effected to ameliorate the working of the CLERP proposed 
rule.  On this see Greenwood, above, n 76 at 30-39. 
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